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In order to handle inconsistent knowledge bases in a reasonable way, one needs a logic which
allows nontrivial inconsistent theories. Logics of this sort are called paraconsistent. One of the oldest
and best known approaches to the problem of designing useful paraconsistent logics is da Costa’s
approach, which seeks to allow the use of classical logic whenever it is safe to do so, but behaves
completely diﬀerently when contradictions are involved. da Costa’s approach has led to the family
of logics of formal (in)consistency (LFIs). In this paper we provide in a modular way simple non-
deterministic semantics for 64 of the most important logics from this family. Our semantics is
three-valued for some of the systems, and inﬁnite-valued for the others. We prove that these results
cannot be improved: neither of the systems with a three-valued non-deterministic semantics has
either a ﬁnite characteristic ordinary matrix or a two-valued characteristic non-deterministic matrix,
and neither of the other systems we investigate has a ﬁnite characteristic non-deterministic matrix.
Still, our semantics provides decision procedures for all the systems investigated, as well as easy
proofs of important proof-theoretical properties of them.
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272 A. Avron / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 271–287‘‘It is a fact of life that large knowledge bases are inherently inconsistent, in the same
way large programs are inherently buggy. Moreover, within a conventional logic, the
inconsistency of a knowledge base has the catastrophic consequence that everything
is derivable from the knowledge base.’’It follows that in order to handle inconsistent knowledge bases in a reasonable way, one
needs an unconventional logic: a logic which allows nontrivial inconsistent theories. Logics
of this sort are called paraconsistent.
There are several approaches to the problem of designing a useful paraconsistent logic
(see e.g. [9,7,14]). One of the oldest and best known is da Costa’s approach [15, 16], which
seeks to allow the use of classical logic whenever it is safe to do so, but behaves completely
diﬀerently when contradictions are involved. da Costa’s approach has led to the family of
LFIs (Logics of Formal (In)consistency—see [13]). This family is based on two main ideas.
The ﬁrst is that propositions should be divided into two sorts: the ‘‘normal’’ (or consistent)
propositions, and the ‘‘abnormal’’ (or inconsistent) ones. Classical logic can (and should)
be applied freely to normal propositions, but not to abnormal ones. The second idea is to
formally introduce this classiﬁcation into the language. When this is done by employing a
special (primitive or deﬁned) unary connective  (where the intuitive meaning of u is ‘‘u is
consistent’’) we get a special type of LFIs: the C-systems ([12]).
The class of C-systems is the most important and useful subclass of the class of logics
of formal (in)consistency. So far, the main shortcoming of this class has been the lack
of a corresponding intuitive semantics, which would be easy to use and would provide
real insight into these logics.1 In this paper we remedy this by providing simple, modular
non-deterministic semantics for the 64 most basic C-systems. Our semantics is based
on the use of non-deterministic matrices (Nmatrices). These are multi-valued struc-
tures (introduced in [1–3]) where the value assigned by a valuation to a complex formula
can be chosen non-deterministically out of a certain non-empty set of options. Although
applicable to a much larger family of logics, the semantics of ﬁnite Nmatrices has all
the advantages that the semantics of ordinary ﬁnite-valued semantics provides. In
particular:
(1) The semantics of ﬁnite Nmatrices is eﬀective (see Proposition 2 below). Hence a logic
with a ﬁnite characteristic Nmatrix is necessarily decidable.
(2) A logic with a ﬁnite characteristic Nmatrix is ﬁnitary (i.e.: the compactness theorem
obtains for it—see [3]).
(3) There is a well-known uniform method [18,8] for constructive cut-free calculus
of n-sequents for any logic which has an n-valued characteristic matrix. This
method can easily be extended to logics which have a ﬁnite characteristic Nmatrix
(see [4]).
Nmatrices seem to be particularly useful for reasoning on uncertainty because uncer-
tainty concerning the truth-value assigned to a formula is their most crucial feature. This
potential in this area is demonstrated in this paper by applying them for the special case of
paraconsistent reasoning.e bivaluations semantics and the possible translations semantics described in [12,13] are not satisfactory
hese points of view. See, e.g. Footnote 5.
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nite-valued for the others. We also prove that our results cannot be improved: neither of
the simpler systems has either a ﬁnite characteristic ordinary matrix or a two-valued char-
acteristic Nmatrix, and neither of the other systems has a ﬁnite characteristic Nmatrix.
Still, our semantics leads easily to decision procedures for all the systems we investigate.
Moreover, as a demonstration of the power of our semantics, we use it to show a very
important proof-theoretical property: in most of the systems we consider two formulas
are logically indistinguishable iﬀ they are identical, and all of the systems have this prop-
erty with respect to formulas without .
2. Preliminaries
2.1. A taxonomy of C-systems
Let Lþcl ¼ f^;_;g, Lcl ¼ f^;_;;:g, and LC ¼ f^;_;;:; g.
Deﬁnition 1. Let HCL+ be some Hilbert-type system which has Modus Ponens as the only
inference rule, and is sound and strongly complete for theLþcl -fragment of CPL (classical
propositional logic).2 The logic B (called mbC in [13]) is the logic in LC obtained from
HCL+ by adding the schemata
(t) :u _ u,
(p) u  ððu ^ :uÞ  wÞ.Deﬁnition 2. Let Ax be the set consisting of the following axioms:
(c) ::u  u,
(e) u  ::u,
(i) :  u  ðu ^ :uÞ,
(a) (u ^ w)  ((u ^ w) ^ (u _ w) ^ (u  w)),
(o) (u _ w)  ((u ^ w) ^ (u _ w) ^ (u  w)),
(l) :ðu ^ :uÞ  u,
(d) :ð:u ^ uÞ  u,
(b) ð:ðu ^ :uÞ _ :ð:u ^ uÞÞ  u.
For X  Ax, B[X] is the system obtained by adding the axioms in X to B.
Notation: We will usually denote B[X] by Bs, where s is a string consisting of the names of
the axioms in X (thus we will write Biel rather than B[{(i),(e),(l)}].3
Note. It is easy to see that the converse of (i) (i.e. u ^ :u  :  u) and the converse of (l)
(i.e. u  :ðu ^ :uÞ) are theorems of B. Together the four implications intuitively mean
that u and :ðu ^ :uÞ ‘‘have the same meaning’’. On the other hand (d) and its converse
(together with (i)) intuitively mean that u and :ð:u ^ uÞ ‘‘have the same meaning’’. At2 That is, for every sentence u and theory T in Lþcl , T ‘HCLþ u iff T ‘CPL u.
3 In the literature on LFIs one usually writes Cs instead of our Bcs when X includes the axiom (c). Thus what we
denote by Bcial is called Cila in [12,13].
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(in fact, this well-known fact easily follows from the results of this paper).
2.2. Non-deterministic matrices
Our main semantic tool in what follows will be the following generalization of the con-
cept of a matrix given in [1–3].4
Deﬁnition 3
(1) A non-deterministic matrix (Nmatrix for short) for a propositional language L is a
tuple M ¼ hV;D;Oi, where
(a) V is a non-empty set of truth values.
(b) D is a non-empty proper subset of V.
(c) For every n-ary connective } ofL, O includes a corresponding n-ary function e
from Vn to 2V  f;g.
We say that M is (in)finite if so is V.
(2) A (legal) valuation in an NmatrixM is a function v :L!V (where we identify, as
usual, a language with its set of formulas) that satisﬁes the following condition for
every n-ary connective } of L and w1; . . . ;wn 2L:
vððw1; . . . ;wnÞÞ 2 eðvðw1Þ; . . . ; vðwnÞÞ
(3) A valuation v in an NmatrixM is a model of (or satisfies) a formula w inM (nota-
tion: v M w) if vðwÞ 2 D. v is a model inM of a set T of formulas (notation: v M T)
if it satisﬁes every formula in T.
(4) ‘M, the consequence relation induced by the NmatrixM, is deﬁned by: T ‘M u if for
every v such that v M T , also v M u.
(5) A logic L ¼ hL;‘Li is sound for an NmatrixM (where L is the language ofM) if
‘L  ‘M. L is complete forM if ‘L  ‘M.M is characteristic for L if L is both sound
and complete for it (i.e.: if ‘L ¼ ‘M). M is weakly-characteristic for L if for every
formula u of L, ‘Lu iff ‘Mu.
Note. We shall identify an ordinary (deterministic) matrix with an Nmatrix whose func-
tions in O always return singletons.
Deﬁnition 4. LetM1 ¼ hV1;D1;O1i andM2 ¼ hV2;D2;O2i be Nmatrices for a language
L.M2 is called a refinement ofM1 ifV2 V1, D2 ¼ D1 \V2, and eM2ð~xÞ  eM1ð~xÞ for
every n-ary connective e of L and every~x 2Vn2.
The following proposition can easily be proved.
Proposition 1. If M2 is a refinement of M1 then ‘M1  ‘M2 . Hence if L is sound for M1
then L is also sound for M2.4 A special two-valued case of this deﬁnition was essentially introduced in [6]. Another particular case of the
same idea, using a similar name, was used in [11]. It should also be noted that Carnielli’s ‘‘possible-translations
semantics’’ (see [10]) was originally called ‘‘non-deterministic semantics’’.
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in the sense that for determining whether T ‘M u (whereM is an Nmatrix) it always suf-
ﬁces to check only partial valuations, deﬁned only on subformulas of T [ {u}. This is due
to the following obvious proposition.5
Proposition 2. LetM ¼ hV;D;Oi be an Nmatrix for L. Assume that L0 is a subset of L
which is closed under subformulas, and that v0 :L0 !V is a partial valuation that respects
M (i.e., v0ððw1; . . . ;wnÞÞ 2 ~ðv0ðw1Þ; . . . ; v0ðwnÞÞ whenever ðw1; . . . ;wnÞ 2L0). Then v 0
can be extended to a (full legal) valuation in M.Corollary 1. If M is a finite Nmatrix then ‘M is decidable.3. The systems with ﬁnite-valued Nmatrices
3.1. The basic system B
Deﬁnition 5
• A basic B-Nmatrix is an Nmatrix for the language LC such that
(1) V ¼T ]I ]F, where T, I, and F are disjoint non-empty sets.
(2) D ¼T [I.
(3) O is deﬁned by
a e_b ¼ D if either a 2 D or b 2 D;
F if a; b 2F
(
a eb ¼ D if either a 2F or b 2 D;
F if a 2 D and b 2F
(
a e^b ¼ F if either a 2F or b 2F;
D otherwise
(
e:a ¼ F if a 2T;
D otherwise
(
ea ¼ V if a 2F [T;
F if a 2 I
(
• A B-Nmatrix is an Nmatrix for LC which is a reﬁnement of some basic B-Nmatrix.
• MB is the three-valued basic B-Nmatrix in which T ¼ ftg, F ¼ ff g, and I ¼ fIg.5 No general similar theorem is available for the semantics of bivaluations or for possible translations semantics
described in [12,13]. Hence a corresponding proposition should be proved from scratch for any useful instance of
these types of semantics.
276 A. Avron / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 271–287It is easy to see that the non-deterministic truth tables corresponding to the operations
in MB areTheorem 1. B is sound for any B-Nmatrix.Proof. It is straightforward to check that B is sound for any basic B-Nmatrix. Hence the
theorem follows from Proposition 1. hTheorem 2. MB is a characteristic Nmatrix for B.
6Proof. Soundness follows from Theorem 1. For completeness, assume that T is a theory
and u0 a sentence such that T 0B u0. We construct a model of T in MB which is not a
model of u0. For this extend T to a maximal theory T* such that T* 0B u0. T* has the fol-
lowing properties:
(1) w 62 T* iff w  u0 2 T*.
(2) If w 62 T* then w  u 2 T* for every sentence u of LC.
(3) u _ w 2 T* iff either u 2 T* or w 2 T*.
(4) u ^ w 2 T* iff both u 2 T* and w 2 T*.
(5) u  w 2 T* iff either u 62 T* or w 2 T*.
(6) For every sentence u of LC, either u 2 T* or :u 2 T.
(7) If both u 2 T* and :u 2 T then u 62 T*.
The proofs of Properties 1–5 are exactly as in the case of HCL+: Property 1 follows
from the deduction theorem (which is obviously valid for B) and the maximality of T*.6 This theorem and the next one were ﬁrst proved (using a diﬀerent argument) in [5]. What is new here
concerning them are the proofs, and their various applications (like Theorems 4–6 below). These results and their
current proofs provide also the necessary basis for the inﬁnite semantics described in the main part of this paper:
Section 4.
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u0 2 T*. Hence u0 2 T* by the tautology ((u0  u)  u0)  u0. A contradiction. Property
2 then follows for all w 62 T* by 1 and the transitivity of implication. Properties 3–5 are
easy corollaries of 1, 2, and the closure of T* under positive classical inferences (for
example: suppose u _ w 2 T*, but neither u 2 T*, nor w 2 T*. By Property 1, u  u0 2 T*
and w  u0 2 T*. Since u0 follows in positive classical logic from u _ w, u  u0, and
w  u0, we get u0 2 T*. A contradiction). Finally, Property 6 is immediate from Property 3
and Axiom (t), and Property 7 follows from Axiom (p).
Deﬁne now a valuation v in MB as follows:
vðwÞ ¼
f if w 62 T;
t if :w 62 T;
I if w 2 T;:w 2 T:
8><>:
Note that by Property 6, v is well deﬁned, and vðwÞ 2 D ¼ fI ; tg iff w 2 T*. We use this to
prove that v is a legal valuation, i.e.: it respects the interpretations of the connectives in
MB. That this is the case for the positive connectives easily follows from Properties 3–5
of T*. We prove next the cases of : and 
• Assume v(w) = f. Then w 62 T*. Hence :w 2 T by Property 6 of T*. Thus
vð:wÞ 2 fI ; tg.
• Assume v(w) = t. By deﬁnition, this implies :w 62 T, whence vð:wÞ ¼ f .
• Assume v(w) = I. By deﬁnition, this implies w 2 T* and :w 2 T. The latter implies
vð:wÞ 2 fI ; tg. Together with the former it also implies that w 62 T*, by Property 7
of T*. Hence v(w) = f.
Since vðwÞ 2 D iﬀ w 2 T*, vðwÞ 2 D for every w 2 T, while vðu0Þ 62 D. Hence v is a model
of T which is not a model of u0. h3.2. Handling (i), (c), (e), (a), and (o)
Deﬁnition 6. The conditions on B-Nmatrices which correspond to the axioms (i), (c), (e),
(a) and (o) are
Cond(i): a 2T [F) ea T.
Cond(c): a 2F) e:a T.
Cond(e): a 2 I) e:a  I.
Cond(a): a 2T [F and b 2T [F) ae]b T [F ð] 2 f_;^;gÞ.
Cond(o): a 2T [F or b 2T [F) ae]b T [F ð] 2 f_;^;gÞ.
Deﬁnition 7. Let S = {i,c,e,ci, ie,ce,cie, ia,cia, iae,ciae, io,cio, ioe,cioe}
• For s 2 S, a Bs-Nmatrix is a B-Nmatrix which satisﬁes Cond(x) for every x which
occurs in s.
• MBs is the unique Bs-Nmatrix in which T ¼ ftg, F ¼ ff g, and I ¼ fIg.
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In MBc, MBci, MBcia, and MBcio the truth table corresponding to : is
In MBe, MBie, MBiae, and MBioe the truth table corresponding to : is
In MBce, MBcie, MBciae, and MBcioe the truth table corresponding to : is
If a occurs in s then in MBs the tables corresponding to {_ , ^ , } are
If o occurs in s then in MBs the tables corresponding to {_ , ^ , } areTheorem 3. For s 2 S:
• Bs is sound for any Bs-Nmatrix.
• MBs is a characteristic Nmatrix for Bs.Proof. To show the ﬁrst part it suﬃces by Theorem 1 to check that for every x 2 {c, i,e},
the validity of schema (x) (in a given B-Nmatrix) follows from Cond(x), and that for every
x 2 {a,o}, the validity of schema (x) follows from Cond(x) together with Cond(i). This is
easy.
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of B. We only have to show that the extra conditions imposed by the extra axioms of Bs on
the valuation v deﬁned in that proof are respected:
• Suppose that (i) is an axiom of Bs, and assume v(u) 2 {t, f}. Then either u 62 T*, or
:u 62 T. Hence (by schema (i)) :  u 62 T By deﬁnition of v, v(u) = t, as required.
• Suppose that both (i) and (a) are axioms of Bs, and that v(u) 2 {t, f}, v(w) 2 {t, f}. Then
by schemata (i) and (t), (u) and (w) are in T*, and so (u]w) 2 T* by Schema (a).
Hence (by Schema (p)) either u]w 62 T*, or :ðu]wÞ 62 T. By deﬁnition of v, this yields
v(u]w) 2 {t, f}, as required.
• Suppose that both (i) and (o) are axioms of Bs, and that either v(u) or v(w) is in {t, f}.
Then by schemata (i) and (t), either (u) or (w) is in T*. Hence (u]w) 2 T* by Schema
(o). This again implies that v(u]w) 2 {t, f}.
• Suppose that (c) is an axiom of Bs, and v(u) = f. Then u 62 T*. Hence ::u 62 T by (c).
By deﬁnition of v, this implies that vð:uÞ ¼ t, as required.
• Suppose that (e) is an axiom of Bs, and v(u) = I. Then u 2 T* and :u 2 T. Hence
:u 2 T, and by (e) also ::u 2 T. By deﬁnition of v, this implies that vð:uÞ ¼ I , as
required. hCorollary 2. All the 16 systems investigated in this section are decidable, and they are all dif-
ferent from each other.
Note. Since (o) obviously entails (a) (using positive classical logic), no element of S in-
cludes both a and o. We also do not consider here logics that include the schema (a), or
the schema (o), but do not include schema (i). In [5] it is shown that by using Nmatrices
with ﬁve truth-values rather than just three, it is possible to provide a completely modular
semantics for all the systems which are based on the axioms dealt with in this section. This
means that each axiom induces its own independent semantic condition, so that the
semantics of a system B[X] is obtained by combining the conditions which correspond
to the axioms in X (in particular, (a) and (o) are treated independently of (i)). It is worth
noting also that in that paper the schema (i) was naturally split into two independent axi-
oms, (a) and (o) were split into three axioms, and completely modular semantics was given
to each of the resulting axioms. Such splitting can easily be done also within the present
three-valued framework.
Examples
(1) ‘Bia:ðu ^ wÞ  ð:u _ :wÞ.
(2) 0Bcie:ðu ^ wÞ  ð:u _ :wÞ.
(3) Let :0w ¼ w, :nþ1w ¼ :ð:nwÞ. Then for all n and u. ‘Bci  :n  u.
To show the ﬁrst part, let v be a legal valuation in MBia. If vð:u _ :wÞ 6¼ f then
vð:ðu ^ wÞ  ð:u _ :wÞÞ 2 ft; Ig. Assume that vð:u _ :wÞ ¼ f . Then vð:uÞ ¼ f and
vð:wÞ ¼ f . Hence v(u) = v(w) = t, and so v(u ^ w) = t. Thus vð:ðu ^ wÞÞ ¼ f , implying
that vð:ðu ^ wÞ  ð:u _ :wÞÞ ¼ t in this case.
For the second part, it suﬃces by Theorem 3 and Proposition 2 to provide the following
refutation inMBcie : vðuÞ ¼ t; vðwÞ ¼ t; vð:uÞ ¼ f ; vð:wÞ ¼ f ; vðu ^ wÞ ¼ I ; vð:ðu ^ wÞÞ ¼
I ; vð:u _ :wÞ ¼ f ; vð:ðu ^ wÞ  ð:u _ :wÞÞ ¼ f .
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v(w) 2 {t, f} then also vð:wÞ 2 ft; f g. It follows that for all n and u, vð:n  uÞ 2 ft; f g, and
so vð:n  uÞ ¼ t.
Now we show that the semantics given in this section to the various systems cannot be
simpliﬁed.
Theorem 4. LetL be eitherLcl orLC, and let L be a logic inL. Assume that the set of valid
formulas of L includes that of positive classical logic, and is included in that of Bcioe. Then L
does not have a finite weakly characteristic (see Definition 3) ordinary (deterministic) matrix.7Proof. Let N be a unary connective deﬁnable inL, and letM be an n-valued deterministic
matrix. Then for every valuation v in M and for every w, v(Nnw) 2 {v(w),v(Nw), . . . ,v
(Nn1w)}. (This is trivial in case all these values are different from each other. If not,
then there are 0 6 i < j < n such that v(Niw) = v(Njw), and so v(Nnw) = v(Ni+(nj)w),
becauseM is deterministic.) Hence for some k < n v(p ^ Np ^ NNp ^ 	 	 	 Nn1p  Nnp) =
v(p ^ Np ^ NNp ^ 	 	 	 Nn1p  Nkp). Since the latter formula is valid in positive classical
logic for every k < n, this entails that if M is an n-valued deterministic matrix for which
positive classical logic is sound, then wn = p ^ Np ^ NNp ^ 	 	 	 Nn1p  Nnp is valid in
M (where p is atomic). Hence this formula is a theorem in every extension of positive clas-
sical logic which has an n-valued characteristic matrix. However, if we take Nu to be
:ðu ^ uÞ we can refute wn in MBcioe by letting v(p) = v(Np) = 	 	 	 = v(Nn1p) = I,
v(Nn1p ^ Nn1p) = t, and v(Nnp) = f. Hence wn is not provable in Bcioe (or in any weaker
system). hTheorem 5. Let L be like in Theorem 4. Then L does not have a weakly characteristic two-
valued Nmatrix.Proof. Let M be a two-valued Nmatrix which is weakly characteristic for L. Obviously,
we may assume that its set of truth-values is {t, f}, with t designated. Since p  p is valid
inM, necessarily eðt; tÞ ¼ eðf ; f Þ ¼ ftg. This and the validity inM of p  (p  p) imply
that eðf ; tÞ ¼ ftg as well. Now had eðt; f Þ ¼ ftg too, we would have got that p  q is
valid in M (where p and q are atomic). This is impossible, since p  q is not a theorem
of Bcioe. It is also impossible that eðt; f Þ ¼ ft; f g, since otherwise the positive classical
tautology p  ((p  q)  q) would not have been valid inM (we could have deﬁned then
a refuting valuation v such that v(p) = t, v(q) = f, v(p  q) = t, v((p  q)  q) = f, and
v(p  ((p  q)  q)) = f). It follows that eðt; f Þ ¼ ff g. Using these facts it is easy to see
that the interpretations of the positive connectives inM should be identical to the classical
ones. The validity of the law of excluded middle forces therefore the condition e:f ¼ ftg.
Hence there are two cases to consider:
• If e:t ¼ ff g then :p  :ðp ^ pÞ is valid in M. Since this formula is not a theorem of
Bcioe (it can easily be refuted in MBcioe),M is not weakly characteristic for L.7 Many particular cases of this theorem have been proved by Marcos and others (see [13]). However, the cases
of Bcioe and Bcio were explicitly left open in [13].
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valid inM. It follows that et ¼ ff g, and so p ^ p  q is valid inM. Since this formula
is not valid in MBcioe, M is not weakly characteristic for L in this case too. h
We end this section with a proof of a very important property of the systems investigated
here.
Deﬁnition 8. Let L be a logic which includes the positive classical logic. Two formulas A
and B are called logically indistinguishable in L if u(A) ‘L u(B) and u(B) ‘L u(A) for every
formula u(p) in the language of L (by u(A) we mean the result of uniformly substituting A
for every occurrence of p in u).Theorem 6. Let L be a logic in a language which includes f:;^;_;g.
(1) If Bciae is an extension of L (i.e. ‘L  ‘Bciae) then two formulas are logically indistin-
guishable in L iff they are identical.
(2) If Bioe is an extension of L then two formulas are logically indistinguishable in L iff
they are identical.
(3) If Bcioe is an extension of L then two formulas in f:;^;_;g are logically indistin-
guishable in L iff they are identical.Proof. For the ﬁrst part, assume that A and B are two different formulas of L, and let q be
any atomic formula not occurring in either A or B. Let v be some legal partial valuation in
MBciae such that v(w) is deﬁned iff w is a subformula of either A  A or B  B. Extend v to a
larger legal partial valuation by letting v(q) = I, v(q  (B  B)) = I, vð:ðq  ðB  BÞÞÞ ¼ I ,
v(q  (A  A)) = t, and vð:ðq  ðA  AÞÞÞ ¼ f (this is possible since both v(A  A) and
v(B  B) are in D). By Proposition 2 it follows that :ðq  ðB  BÞÞ 0L :ðq  ðA  AÞÞ.
Hence A and B are not logically indistinguishable in L.
For the second part, assume again that A and B are two different formulas of L, and
assume without a loss in generality that A  A is not a subformula of B  B. It is easy to see
that there exists a legal partial valuation v in MBioe such that v(w) is deﬁned iff w is a
subformula of :::ðB  BÞ, and v(B  B) = t, vð:ðB  BÞÞ ¼ f , vð::ðB  BÞÞ ¼ I ,
vð:::ðB  BÞÞ ¼ I . Extend v to a partial valuation deﬁned also for all subformulas of
:::ðA AÞ such that v(A  A) = t, vð:ðA AÞÞ ¼ f , vð::ðA AÞÞ ¼ t, vð:::ðA AÞÞ ¼ f .
By Proposition 2 it follows that :::ðB BÞ0L :::ðA AÞ. Hence A and B are not
logically indistinguishable in L.
The proof of the third part is similar to that of the ﬁrst. However, this time we use
MBcioe instead of MBciae, and we start with a partial valuation v such that v(w) = I
for every subformula of either A  A or B  B (such v is legal since neither A nor B
contains ). h
Note. Extensions of Bcio do not have the property described in the ﬁrst two parts of the
last theorem (and so its third part cannot be improved). Thus by usingMBcio it is easy to
show that  A   A and  B   B are logically indistinguishable in Bcio for any two for-
mulas A and B.
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We turn now to the extensions of the systems handled in the previous section by the
schemata (l), (d) and their combination (b).
Deﬁnition 9. Let T ¼ ftji jiP 0; jP 0g, I ¼ fIji jiP 0; jP 0g, F ¼ ff g. Deﬁne the
following Nmatrices for the language LC:
MBl: This is the Nmatrix hV;D;Oi where
(1) V ¼T [I [F.
(2) D ¼T [I.
(3) O is deﬁned by
ae_b ¼ D if either a 2 D or b 2 D;
F if a; b 2F

aeb ¼ D if either a 2F or b 2 D;
F if a 2 D and b 2F

a e^b ¼ F if either a 2F or b 2FT if a ¼ Iji and b 2 fIjþ1i ; tjþ1i g;
D otherwise
8><>:
e:a ¼ F if a 2T;D if a 2F;
fIjþ1i ; tjþ1i g if a ¼ Iji
8><>:
ea ¼ D if a 2F [T;
F if a 2 I
MBd: This is deﬁned like MBl, except that e^ is deﬁned as follows:
a e^b ¼ F if either a 2F or b 2F;T if b ¼ Iji and a 2 fIjþ1i ; tjþ1i g;
D otherwise
8><>:
MBb: This is deﬁned like MBl, except that e^ is deﬁned as follows:
a e^b ¼ F if either a 2F or b 2F;T ðif a ¼ Iji and b 2 fIjþ1i ; tjþ1i gÞ or ðb ¼ Iji and a 2 fIjþ1i ; tjþ1i gÞ;
D otherwise
8><>:
Theorem 7. For y 2 {l,d,b}, MBy is a characteristic Nmatrix for By.Proof. We do the proof in the case of Bl. The proofs in the other two cases are very
similar.
A. Avron / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 271–287 283It is easy to check thatMBl is a B-Nmatrix. To prove soundness, we need therefore to
show only that (l) is valid in it. So let v be anMBl-legal valuation, and let u be a sentence
such that vðuÞ 62 D. Then vðuÞ ¼ Iji for some i,j. Hence vð:uÞ 2 fIjþ1i ; tjþ1i g, and so
vðu ^ :uÞ 2T, and vð:ðu ^ :uÞÞ ¼ f . Hence vð:ðu ^ :uÞ  uÞ 2 D, as required.
To prove completeness, assume that T 0Bl u0. Extend T to a maximal theory T* such
that T* 0Bl u0. Then T* has the Properties 1–7 from the proof of Theorem 2. Let ki Æ ai be
an enumeration of all the formulas ofLC that do not begin with :. Then for any formula
w ofLC there are unique n(w), k(w) such that w ¼ :kðwÞanðwÞ, where :kh is h preceded by k
negation symbols. Deﬁne a valuation v in MBl as follows:
vðwÞ ¼
f w 62 T;
tkðwÞnðwÞ :w 62 T;
IkðwÞnðwÞ w 2 T;:w 2 T
8>><>>:
Now we show that v isMBl-legal. The proofs that it is well deﬁned and respects the oper-
ations corresponding to _ and  are like in the proof of Theorem 2. We consider next the
cases of , : and ^.
: That v(w) = f in case vðwÞ 2 I is shown as in the proof of Theorem 2. Assume next
that vðwÞ 2T [F. Then either w 62 T*, or :w 62 T. It follows that w ^ :w 62 T, and
so :ðw ^ :wÞ 2 T (by Property 6). Hence w 2 T* by (l), and so vðwÞ 2 D.:: The proofs that v(w) = f implies vð:wÞ 2 D and that vðwÞ 2T implies vð:wÞ ¼ f are
like in the proof of Theorem 2. Assume next that vðwÞ ¼ Ikn. Then both w and :w are
in T*, and w ¼ :kan. Thus :w 2 T, and :w ¼ :kþ1an. It follows by deﬁnition of v that
vð:wÞ is either Ikþ1n or tkþ1n (depending whether ::w is in T* or not).^: The proofs that if v(w1) = f or v(w2) = f then v(w1 ^ w2) = f, and that vðw1 ^ w2Þ 2 D
otherwise, are like in the proof of Theorem 2. Assume next that vðw1Þ ¼ Ikn and
vðw2Þ 2 fIkþ1n ; tkþ1n g. Then both w1 and w2 are in T*, and w1 ¼ :kan, w2 ¼ :kþ1an. It fol-
lows that w2 ¼ :w1, and that w1 ^ :w1 2 T. This entails (by Property 7) that w1 62 T*.
Hence schema (l) implies that :ðw1 ^ :w1Þ 62 T, and so :ðw1 ^ w2Þ 62 T. Thus
vðw1 ^ w2Þ 2T.
Obviously, vðwÞ 2 D for every w 2 T, while v(u0) = f. Hence T 0MBl u0. hDeﬁnition 10. For y 2 {l,d,b} and s 2 S (see Deﬁnition 7),MBsy is the weakest reﬁnement
of MBy which satisﬁes Cond(x) for every x which occurs in s. In other words, MBsy is
obtained from MBy through the following modiﬁcations:
(1) If i occurs in s then: a 2F [T) eðaÞ ¼T.
(2) If c occurs in s then: e:f ¼T.
(3) If e occurs in s then: e:ðI jiÞ ¼ fIjþ1i g.
(4) If a occurs in s then:• a 2T and b 2T) a e^b ¼T.
• a 2T; b 62 I or b 2T; a 62 I) a e_b ¼T.
• a 2F; b 62 I or b 2T; a 62 I) a eb ¼T.
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• a 2T; b 62F or b 2T; a 62F) a e^b ¼T.
• a 2T or b 2T) a e_b ¼T.
• a 2F or b 2T) a eb ¼T.Theorem 8. For y 2 {l,d,b} and s 2 S, MBsy is a characteristic Nmatrix for Bsy.Proof. It is easy to check thatMBsy is both a Bs-Nmatrix, and a reﬁnement ofMBy . Hence
the soundness of Bsy forMBsy follows from the ﬁrst part of Theorem 3, Theorem 7, and
Proposition 1. The proof of its completeness is a straightforward adaptation of the
completeness proof of MBy , similar to what was done in the proof of the second part of
Theorem 3. hCorollary 3. All the 64 systems considered in this paper are different from each other.Proof. Let L be one of these logics. It can easily be checked that any axiom from Ax (Def-
inition 2) which does not directly follows by classical positive logic from an ofﬁcial axiom
of L, is not valid in ML. hDeﬁnition 11. LDB ¼ fBy j y 2 fl; d; bgg [ fBsy j s 2 S; y 2 fl; d; bggCorollary 4. Every logic L 2LDB is decidable.Proof. Theorem 8 and its proof easily imply that to check whether a given formula u is
provable in L, it sufﬁces to check all legal partial valuations v inML which assign to sub-
formulas of u values in
ff g [ ftji j0 6 i 6 nðuÞ; 0 6 j 6 kðuÞg [ fIji j0 6 i 6 nðuÞ; 0 6 j 6 kðuÞg
where n*(u) is the number of subformulas of u which do not begin with :, and k*(u) is the
maximal number of consecutive negation symbols occurring within u. This is a ﬁnite
process. h
The proof of Corollary 4 indicates that simpler inﬁnite Nmatrices would be suﬃcient
for characterizing the sets of provable formulas considered there.Deﬁnition 12. For L 2LDB, letMweakL be the simplest reﬁnement ofML in which the set
of truth values is ff g [ ftj0 j 0 6 jg [ fIj0 j 0 6 jÞg.Theorem 9. For L 2LDB:
(1) MweakL is weakly characteristic for L.
(2) MweakL is not characteristic for L.
A. Avron / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007) 271–287 285Proof
(1) SinceMweakL is a reﬁnement ofML, L is sound forM
weak
L . For completeness, assume
0Lu. Then u has a refuting valuation in ML of the type described in the proof of
Corollary 4. Obtain from it a refuting valuation in MweakL by using t
ðkðuÞþ1Þiþj
0 and
I ðk
ðuÞþ1Þiþj
0 instead of t
j
i and I
j
i , respectively.
(2) Let p, q and r be three distinct propositional variables. Deﬁne:
NðpÞ ¼ f:kpjk P 0g Cðp; qÞ ¼ f:ðu ^ wÞju 2 NðpÞ;w 2 NðqÞgLet T = N(p) [ N(q) [ C(p,q) [ C(q,p). It is easy to construct a model of T inML which is
not a model of r. Hence T0L r. We show that in contrast, T ‘MweakL r. Assume e.g. that (l) is
an axiom of L, and let v be a model in MweakL of N(p) [ N(q). Then in v all formulas in
N(p) [ N(q) should get a value in fIj0j0 6 jÞg. It follows that for some m, either
vðpÞ ¼ vð:mqÞ or vðqÞ ¼ vð:mpÞ. In the ﬁrst case vð:ðp ^ :mþ1qÞÞ ¼ f , while in the second
vð:ðq ^ :mþ1pÞÞ ¼ f . Hence T has no model in MweakL , and so indeed T ‘MweakL r. h
We next extend Theorem 6 to the family LDB.
Theorem 10. Let L be a logic in a language which includes f:;^;_;g.
(1) If Bciaeb is an extension of L then two formulas are logically indistinguishable in L iff
they are identical.
(2) If Bioeb is an extension of L then two formulas are logically indistinguishable in L iff
they are identical.
(3) If Bcioeb is an extension of L then two formulas in f:;^;_;g are logically indistin-
guishable in L iff they are identical.Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 6. hCorollary 5. da Costa’s system C1 ([15]) is decidable, and two formulas are logically indis-
tinguishable in it iff they are identical.8Proof. In [12,13] it is shown that C1 and Bcial (which is called there Cila) have the same
theorems in the language of C1. Hence the decidability of C1 follows from that of Bcial
(Corollary 4). The second part of the corollary directly follows from Theorem 10. h
We end the paper by showing that the inﬁnite-valued semantics given in this section
cannot be replaced by a ﬁnite-valued one.
Theorem 11. No logic between Bl or Bd and Bcioeb can have a finite characteristic Nmatrix.8 The decidability of C1, as well as most of the other decidability results of this paper, are not new. See [13] for
references.
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thatM ¼ hVM ;DM ;OMi is an n-valued characteristic Nmatrix for L (n ﬁnite). Deﬁne T to
be the union of the following three sets:
fpij1 6 i 6 nþ 1g
f:pij1 6 i 6 nþ 1g
f:ðpi ^ :pjÞji 6¼ j; 1 6 i 6 nþ 1; 1 6 j 6 nþ 1g
Deﬁne a valuation v inMBcioeb by v(pn+2) = f, vðpiÞ ¼ I0i , vð:piÞ ¼ I1i , vðpi ^ :pjÞ ¼ I00, and
vð:ðpi ^ :pjÞÞ ¼ I10 for 1 6 i 6 n + 1,1 6 j 6 n + 1, i5 j. It is easy to check that v is a (par-
tial) legal valuation inMBcioeb. Obviously, v is a model of T which is not a model of pn+2.
Hence T 0Bcioeb pi+2, and so T 0L pi+2. SinceM is characteristic for L, there is a valuation
v0 inM which is a model of T but not a model of pn+2. By the pigeonhole principle, there
are 1 6 i0 < j0 6 n + 1 such that v0ðpi0Þ ¼ v0ðpj0Þ. Deﬁne now a new valuation v1 by
v1(pn+2) = v0(pn+2), v1ðpi0Þ ¼ v0ðpi0Þ, v1ð:pi0Þ ¼ v0ð:pj0Þ, v1ðpi0 ^ :pi0Þ ¼ v0ðpi0 ^ :pj0Þ,
and v1ð:ðpi0 ^ :pi0ÞÞ ¼ v0ð:ðpi0 ^ :pj0ÞÞ. Since v0 is legal in M, and v0ðpi0Þ ¼ v0ðpj0Þ, v1
is also legal in M. Now v0 is a model of T, and so it is a model of fpi0 ;:pj0 ;:ðpi0 ^ :pj0Þg. Hence v1 is a model of fpi0 ;:pi0 ;:ðpi0 ^ :pi0Þg. On the other hand, v1 is
not a model of pn+2 (because v0 is not a model of pn+2). Since L is sound forM, it follows
that fpi0 ;:pi0 ;:ðpi0 ^ :pi0Þg 0L pnþ2. This contradicts the fact that fpi0 ;:pi0 ;:ðpi0 ^ :pi0Þg‘Bl pnþ2, for L is an extension of Bl. hCorollary 6. da Costa C1 has no finite characteristic Nmatrix.Proof. This follows from Theorem 11, and the fact that Bcial is interpretable in C1. h
Note. The lack of ﬁnite characteristic ordinary matrices for some C-systems has
been known before (see [13]). However, what is proved in Theorem 11 is a much stronger
result!5. Conclusion
In this paper we provide in a modular way simple non-deterministic semantics for 64 of
the most important C-systems. This semantics makes these logics much more usable for
reasoning with contradictory data than they have been so far, because it leads to easy deci-
sion procedures, and also makes it much easier than before to discover and prove proof-
theoretical properties of these systems. In addition (and this may be even more important),
the modular semantics shed light on the intuitive meaning of each of the axioms and sys-
tems. Thus the semantic condition that corresponds to axiom (i) intuitively means that if a
formula u is consistent, then u is both consistent and true. Similarly, the condition that
corresponds to axiom (e) intuitively means that if a formula u is inconsistent, then so is its
negation. Similar intuitive interpretations are given to the other axioms by the semantic
conditions which correspond to them. These intuitive interpretations can, in turn, guide
a potential user in choosing amomg the C-systems the one that best suits his needs, intu-
itions, and his intended application.
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